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The Power of Mixed Messages:
Women, Peace, and Security Language 
in National Action Plans from Africa 
Heidi Hudson 
Abstract: Against the backdrop of global and continental women, peace, 
and security discourses, this contribution analyses the gender and 
women-focused language of national action plans from four African 
countries (Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda), which were drafted with 
a view to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. I argue that 
national action plans have the potential to transcend the soft-consensus 
language of Security Council resolutions because they create new spaces 
for feminist engagement with policy and practice. The analysis reveals 
three discursive themes – namely, the making of “womenandchildren,” 
women civilising war, and making women responsible for preventing 
gender-based violence. The themes relate to the construction of, respec-
tively, gender(ed) identities, security, and violence. To varying degrees, 
the plans reflect a combination of predominantly liberal-feminist lan-
guage interspersed with some examples of critical insight. I conclude that 
the ambiguous nature of the messages sent out by these plans serves as a 
reminder that discourses are fragmented and therefore offer an opening 
for nuanced contextual analyses and implementation. 
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In May 2000 a workshop hosted by the Namibian government and or-
ganised by the Lessons Learned Unit of the United Nations Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations was held in Windhoek. That event and the 
subsequent Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on 
mainstreaming gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations are com-
monly regarded as catalysts for the adoption of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
in October 2000. Since then, a loosely consolidated transnational WPS 
agenda has emerged. It coheres to the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 (2000) 
– namely, participation of women in conflict resolution and peace pro-
cesses; gender mainstreaming in conflict-prevention initiatives; protection 
of women’s rights and bodies in peace and war; and relief and recovery, 
especially for survivors of sexual violence. Seven other WPS resolutions 
have subsequently seen the light, each emphasising these four pillars to 
varying degrees.1  
However, the WPS debate of the last 17 years has become quite po-
larised. On the one hand, a largely optimistic feminist school of thought 
argues for the power of norm diffusion, maintaining that the WPS resolu-
tions signify a major shift in the way the UN thinks about security (Hud-
son 2009a, 2009b; Tryggestad 2009, 2010). On the other hand, a critical-
feminist position maintains that the WPS architecture has left gendered 
power relations largely unchallenged (Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger 2008; 
Cohn 2008; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Shepherd 2008, 2011). At the 
heart of this contention lies the fact that despite a growing WPS normative 
agenda, there is an implementation gap – the lives of women in conflict-
ridden areas remain unchanged, and women continue to play a marginal 
role in formal peace talks. In 2007 the UN secretary-general therefore 
called on member states to ensure the consideration of gender in peace-
building processes through national action plans (NAP) (UN Secretary-
General 2007). NAPs, as one of the main mechanisms of policy imple-
mentation (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 2014), mirror the tension between 
these schools of thought. Critics argue that NAPs perpetuate the flaws of 
UNSCR 1325, whereas norm-entrepreneur proponents see NAPs as a 
means of domesticating these international gender norms.  
Such bifurcation is not helpful in gaining a better understanding of 
the place of NAPs in the broader WPS framework. The two schools of 
thought offer us an impossible choice between two universalised options 
– one that assumes that NAPs from the global South are multipliers of 
1  UNSCR 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 
(2013), and 2242 (2015). 
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international (interventionist) discourse and therefore problematic, and 
the other that these international gender norms will necessarily find 
context-specific translation through NAPs. In search of a more nuanced 
position, it thus becomes necessary to let these texts speak for them-
selves. Towards that end, I make the gender language and discursive 
power of four African NAPs (Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda) the 
subject of analysis. I aim to deconstruct and assess through discourse 
analysis whether, or to what extent, the language of the plans offers an 
alternative reading beyond the two oppositional WPS discourses. I there-
fore ask whether the representational power of language itself can in fact 
be harnessed for transformational purposes while it coexists (albeit un-
easily) with the mechanics of NAP operationalisation in patriarchal and/ 
or deeply politicised contexts.  
The article opens with a discussion of the role and context of NAPs 
that informed the African case selection. This is followed by a literature 
review of the dominant WPS discourses and concepts. These concepts 
facilitate the identification of three discursive themes against which I 
then read the plans. The themes concern how gender/women, security, 
and violence are constructed and represented, guided by the under-
standing that gender plays a role in the construction of peace and con-
flict, which in turn shapes understandings of gender. In terms of identity, 
the first theme, I highlight the large-scale conflation of constructs such 
as gender and women as well as “womenandgirls.” In the second theme, 
security discourses display a civilising intent through the participation of 
women in the security sector (“making war civil for and through 
women”). The third theme captures violence seen through a sexualised 
lens. It privileges women’s protection yet still makes women responsible 
for preventing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The findings 
suggest that these NAPs send out mixed messages in terms of women’s 
identity, participation, and protection. I conclude that this very ambiguity 
is what gives these plans a transformational edge – it provides the crea-
tive space where a holistic mix of radical-feminist/liberal-feminist equal-
ity language together with pragmatic execution can bring about more 
inclusive security practices.  
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National Action Plans: Role, Context,
and Case Selection 
The UN defines a NAP as  
a document that details the actions that a government is currently 
taking, and those initiatives that it will undertake within a given 
time frame, in order to meet the obligations set out in all of the 
WPS resolutions. (Popovic, Lyytikainen, and Barr 2010: xv)  
Such plans also help national stakeholders “to identify priorities, determine 
responsibilities, [and] allocate resources” (Coomaraswamy 2015: 240), to 
mediate the gap between international WPS standards and the dynamics of 
the national levels (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b).  
Of the 67 NAPs currently in place,2 46 (68 per cent) are from the 
global South, of which 19 (28 per cent of the total 67) are from Africa. 
The fact that African states with NAPs comprise nearly 41 per cent of 
the NAPs from the global South is explained by a combination of fac-
tors. Most of these African states have experienced some form of violent 
conflict or are currently in a post-conflict phase where the general levels 
of women’s political, socio-economic, and physical insecurity remain 
high in the aftermath of war. African countries with NAPs include Côte 
d’Ivoire (2007), Uganda (2008), Liberia (2009), Guinea (2009), Sierra 
Leone (2010), Rwanda (2010), the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(2010), Guinea-Bissau (2011), Burundi (2011), Togo (2011), Senegal 
(2011), Mali (2012), Burkina Faso (2012), Ghana (2012), Nigeria (2013), 
Central African Republic (2014), Gambia (2014), Kenya (2016), and 
South Sudan (2016).  
Given the limited scope of this article, I selected only four NAPs 
from Africa for analysis: Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda. My case 
selection was guided by four factors: comprehensiveness, time of adop-
tion, regional location, and whether countries are post-conflict or not. 
First, it is assumed that a more comprehensive plan will offer more op-
portunity for detailed analysis. Both the Liberian NAP (LNAP) and the 
Ugandan plan (UNAP) incorporated the content of UNSCR 1325 and 
UNSCR 1820, with the latter also taking the Goma Declaration (2008) 
on eradicating sexual violence and ending impunity in the Great Lakes 
Region into account (Republic of Liberia 2009; Republic of Uganda 
2008). The Nigerian plan (NNAP) captured the first five WPS resolu-
tions (Government of Nigeria 2013), and the Kenyan plan (KNAP) has 
2  As of August 2017. 
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had the advantage of drawing on the whole suite of WPS resolutions and 
on the Sustainable Development Goals (Government of Kenya 2016: 7–9, 
13). Second, I selected two plans that were adopted during the early phases 
of this call for NAP development (Uganda [2008] and Liberia [2009]) and 
two that were adopted more recently (Nigeria [2013] and Kenya [2016]) to 
allow for some learning to have taken place. Third, although I do not en-
gage with discursive contexts in this article, I selected two cases from West 
Africa (Liberia and Nigeria) and two from East Africa (Kenya and 
Uganda) to capture possible contextual variation. Fourth, I selected one 
country that adopted plans as it came out of war (Liberia), one that is ex-
periencing protracted conflicts in certain areas (Uganda), and two that 
identified more with a broader range of “smaller” conflicts linked to 
human insecurity (over oil in Nigeria, pastoralism in Kenya, and terror-
ism in both countries). The human-security issues that come with having 
large populations of displaced people is, for example, a contextual factor 
present in all four cases.  
Even though the focus in this article is on global South cases that 
have undergone or are still experiencing protracted violence and insecur-
ity in some form, it would be incorrect to assume that all global South 
and/or African NAPs are in post-war contexts. Over the years, two 
broad types of plans have evolved: outward- and inward-looking plans. 
So-called “outward-looking” plans are described as being mainly from 
developed countries whose plans are framed to guide their peacebuilding 
assistance to conflict-affected states; they are focused on international 
engagement. By contrast, “inward-looking” plans come from countries 
mostly emerging from conflict, assisted by UN agencies and donor states 
(Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 2014). These plans have a stronger domes-
tic orientation (Shepherd 2016). This distinction may, however, be too 
artificial and ultimately essentialising,3 because it reinforces the North–
South binary. The Nigerian NAP is an outlier – outward-looking because 
of its strong foreign policy involvement in peacekeeping, yet not neces-
sarily in the same category as countries such as Australia and Norway 
when it comes to providing external assistance. Although NAPs have 
become foreign policy tools for many developed-world countries such as 
Australia (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b), it would be wrong to view actors 
in the global South as mere passive recipients of NAPs.4  
Therefore, rather than trying to fit the four African NAPs into neat 
categories, I prefer to label them loosely as contexts where conflict-related 
3  Thank you to the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
4  Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS) was a founding member of the NGO Working 
Group on WPS (Basu 2016). 
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and/or more general human-security issues (whether post-war or not) 
prevail in an acute form. Within this context, my focus is on the language 
and representations (discourses) of these four plans. In comparison to 
several studies on UNSCR 1325 and other WPS resolutions with a dis-
course-analytical slant (Cohn 2008; Hudson 2015; Puechguirbal 2010; 
Shepherd 2008), very few studies have examined the (feminist) language/ 
discourse of NAPs, and those that do exist remain limited to analyses of 
global North NAPs (Lee-Koo 2016; Shepherd 2016). The larger body of 
work on NAPs for UNSCR 1325 has coalesced around the development 
of toolkits as well as content analyses, focusing on technical and process 
lessons (e.g. Gumru and Fritz 2009; Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 2014; 
Popovic, Lyytikainen, and Barr 2010). Studies on global patterns of WPS 
policy diffusion (True 2016) and regional “impact” studies (e.g. Basini and 
Ryan 2016; Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011) are relatively recent devel-
opments. Thus, while the benefits of NAPs as a tool to translate political 
purpose into concrete guidelines are well documented (Miller, Pournik, 
and Swaine 2014; Popovic, Lyytikainen, and Barr 2010), the aim in this 
article is rather to assess, via the three themes, whether the language used 
in these four plans has the potential to contribute to the transformation of 
entrenched sites of power.  
In the next section I review the broad “camps” within feminist secur-
ity studies literature, their views on language, as well as WPS trends on the 
African continent. I clarify key concepts of gender, security, and violence 
from a variety of perspectives and draw on these conceptualisations for the 
construction of the three themes in the discourse analysis section. 
WPS Discourses and the Language of NAPs 
As mentioned in the introduction, divergent discourses have emerged on 
the growing WPS agenda and the “utility” of language in NAPs. The case 
for WPS norm diffusion through gender language is wedded to liberal-
feminist assumptions and is consequently contested by critical-feminist 
scholars who contend that gender-sensitive language often serves the inter-
ests of the dominant. 
With regard to the former, Torunn Tryggestad (2009, 2010) argues 
that linking gender equality and women’s rights to international peace and 
security through the adoption of UNSCR 1325 signifies a shift in both 
policy and rhetoric. Helga Hernes (2014) also argues that the evolution of 
international norms on women’s rights has benefitted women coming out 
of conflict particularly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Local women 
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were able to invoke these norms to argue for the inclusion of these norms 
into constitutions, peace accords, and ceasefire agreements.  
Supporters of global gender-norm diffusion view the increase in the 
number of NAPs as evidence of growing norm diffusion. NAPs are 
regarded welcome carriers of gender norms, shifting UNSCR 1325 from 
formal adoption at the international level to the national level of juris-
diction (True 2016). Period effects were evident around the tenth and 
fifteenth anniversaries of UNSCR 1325 (True 2016), such as during the 
preparation of the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 
(Coomaraswamy 2015). Proponents also cite progression in the (fem-
inist) rights language used as evidence of the institutionalisation of WPS 
ideas and the eventual constitution of a WPS architecture (Hudson 
2015). Following UNSCR 1325 (2000), which grounds the message 
about women’s agency in peace and conflict, UNSCR 1820 (2008) rec-
ognises rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes against hu-
manity. UNSCR 1888 (2009) broadens the language to refer to “survi-
vors” and not just victims of SGBV. Both UNSCR 1889 (2009) and 
1960 (2010) expand the scope by emphasising accountability mechan-
isms to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The language of 
UNSCR 2106 (2013) singles out male survivors of SGBV, while UNSCR 
2122 (2013) deepens the focus on systematic implementation of com-
mitments by calling for the 2015 High-Level Review of UNSCR 1325. 
Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960, and 2106 focus on prevention of violence 
and on protection (women’s victimhood), with Resolutions 1889 and 2122 
prioritising women’s participation in peace and security governance 
(women’s agency) (Shepherd 2014). The most recent WPS addition, 
UNSCR 2242 (2015), appears to have broadened the exclusive focus on 
women and girls to an agenda that considers women and gender more 
broadly. A strong normative case can therefore be made that the WPS 
resolutions collectively have contributed to a significant broadening of 
how we define international security (Hudson 2015). 
Where one feminist school applauds the introduction of progressive 
feminist content in international security architecture, the radical school 
(e.g. Gibbings 2011; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011) argues that the 
language of the WPS resolutions and NAPs may appear feminist but in 
fact entrenches militarist and Western/imperialist positions (Basu 2016). 
Such language undermines the anti-war feminist objectives instrumental 
in the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Binder, Lukas, and Schweiger 2008; 
Cohn 2008; Gibbings 2011; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Puech-
guirbal 2010; Shepherd 2008, 2011). It is also argued that such language 
foregrounds a narrow peace related to the absence of armed conflict. 
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The silence on cultures of violence, which lie at the root of armed con-
flicts and are carried over into the post-conflict period, means that 
radical-feminist ideals are eclipsed by traditional security concerns. The 
growing emphasis on NAPs as an end in themselves has therefore con-
tributed to the securitisation of the WPS agenda (Miller, Pournik, and 
Swaine 2014).  
The critique of the neoliberal underpinnings of UNSCR 1325 (e.g. 
Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings 2004; True 2011) maintains that feminist 
norms and women’s rights are hijacked to serve international develop-
ment and security interests. The dominance of liberal-feminist UN dis-
course leads to an overemphasis on gender equality and an almost exclu-
sive focus on women. In the process, gender and sex (women) are con-
flated and stereotypical constructions of women as victims and peace-
makers and men as perpetrators or protectors become the norm. Critics 
also regard as problematic the connection that is made in UNSCR 1325 
between women’s so-called “participation” (presence) and positive 
change. States include women in peacekeeping operations because they 
assume it will socialise actors to behave “better.” They tend to make a 
normative and policy link between the inclusion of women and more 
democratic, accountable governance and the goal of more peace and se-
curity (True 2011).  
This critical-feminist school therefore sees UNSCR 1325 NAPs as 
problem-solving tools that perpetuate the stereotypical fixation on adding 
women through participation, representation, and protection practices. In 
this view, it becomes difficult to reconcile the feminist language and quan-
titative indicators of the plans. It is argued that operational issues often 
eclipse language, or that they depoliticise feminist language and co-opt it 
within quantitative accountability frameworks (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 
2014). The case of Liberia illustrates this dilemma. The plan contains over 
190 indicators, which proved to be challenging in a conflict-ravaged coun-
try where data-collection mechanisms are being reconstructed. As a result, 
the Ministry of Gender and Development, supported by UNIFEM, prior-
itised 21 indicators to make the process more manageable (Popovic, Lyyti-
kainen, and Barr 2010), but may have failed in effecting structural change, 
as illustrated by Basini and Ryan (2016) in the context of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. Indicators cannot tell us why certain patterns emerge, and radical-
feminist concepts of empowerment/agency cannot be translated into 
practice in short time-frames.  
An ambiguous picture emerges when it comes to the manifestation of 
these divergent WPS discourses in the African context. There is a case to 
be made for WPS norm visibility in Africa through gender-equality lan-
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guage, or what Toni Haastrup calls an “emergent gender-equality regime” 
(Haastrup 2014: 103). African governments and regional organisations are 
increasingly recognising the impact of both conflict on women and 
women’s roles in peacebuilding – for instance, when African leaders de-
clared 2010–2020 the “African Women’s Decade.” Instruments such as 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) (AU 2003) and the AU Solemn Decla-
ration on Gender Equality in Africa (AU 2004) offer opportunities for Afri-
can Union member states to apply the principles of UNSCR 1325. The 
Solemn Declaration mentions the resolution explicitly and informs the 
Action Plan for the Solemn Declaration, the AU Gender Policy (2009) (AU 
2009), and the Gender Is My Agenda Campaign (2007) (Haastrup 2014; 
Olonisakin, Hendricks, and Okech 2015).  
At the regional level, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development (2008) (Article 28) calls for the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. The SADC Gender Policy (2009) also 
urges member states to eliminate SGBV and all other forms of violence 
towards women and girls (Olonisakin, Hendricks, and Okech 2015). In 
2006 the Pact on Peace, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region 
adopted by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) also integrated WPS principles (Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 
2014). The development of regional action plans (RAPs) helps to foster 
shared understandings and the diffusion of common norms. The Eco-
nomic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention 
Framework (ECPF) contains a WPS section, and its action plan for this 
component was adopted in 2010 (Olonisakin, Hendriks, and Okech 
2015; Miller, Pournik, and Swaine 2014). The Women and Peace Forum 
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is also 
implementing and monitoring a RAP (Sigsworth and Kumalo 2016).  
Be that as it may, norm visibility alone constitutes an incomplete 
project. Institutionalisation happens only when policymakers actually 
“get” and accept the language (Hudson 2015). Despite evidence of rhet-
orical commitments, African feminist security scholars measure substan-
tive progress in terms of the successful convergence of feminist security 
analysis, civil society activism, and policy decision-making. They contend 
that in Africa at present these three agendas or pillars of influence re-
main “organically disconnected” (Olonisakin, Hendricks, and Okech 
2015: 377). The result is a piecemeal and superficial approach to the 
application of UNSCR 1325 in Africa. The flipside of this is the fact that 
feminist academics, practitioners, and policymakers do not always agree 
on what makes their language and practices feminist. This helps to 
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counter positions of narrow consensus. The two feminist academic posi-
tions on WPS also do not operate as stark opposites in reality but rather 
reflect a much more nuanced coexistence.  
If we then read the plans with less of an ideological bias, three as-
sumptions about the role of language in the WPS agenda and plans need 
to be made explicit. First, feminist meaning-making of NAPs does not 
exist separately from implementation – discourse and reality (NAPs and 
their operationalisation) are co-constituted. So despite the fact that glo-
bal feminist language is no guarantee for successful implementation, as 
illustrated by Katrina Lee-Koo (2016) in her analysis of the Australian 
NAP, implementation is not just an empirical issue, but also connected 
to how participation, protection, prevention, and gender equality are 
discursively produced through the plan itself. Second, language is not 
static. It is incorrect to assume that the so-called narrow and exclusionary 
militarist and masculinist language (Cohn 2008) upon which the consen-
sus language of UNSCR 1325 is built always determines or fixes the kind 
of NAP language used. NAPs have more creative licence than UNSC 
resolutions since they “can create new spaces and entry points for a 
range of actors to dialogue with one another,” raising awareness and 
deepening the understanding of the relevance of UNSCR 1325 (Hudson 
2015: 20). Third, if language is seen as a conduit for policy, then its po-
tential to transform the material conditions of people is foregrounded. 
The power of language is not only symbolic but also tangible – as it 
captures norms aimed at influencing attitudes and behaviours nationally 
and internationally (Hudson 2015; Tryggestad 2009).  
Discourse Analysis of African NAPs  
Drawing on the variegated arguments encapsulated by the WPS agenda, a 
critical discourse analysis of the four African NAPs reveals representa-
tional themes related to three pre-selected concepts: gendered identity, 
security, and violence. The methodology involved reading the texts against 
the grain – that is, contrary to their ostensible logic to expose taken-for-
granted usage of these concepts. The discursive themes analysed below are 
therefore phrased in a way to capture the dominant feminist critiques of 
UN texts. However, to avoid the risk of prescriptively foregrounding one 
perspective, the actual reading itself was done in an open-ended manner to 
expose not only what was missing but also to read the liberal-feminist slant 
in a more productive and constructive way.  
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Gender Identity Constructions: The Making of 
“Womenandchildren”
In this section I deconstruct the gender logic used in the plans. My first 
aim is to determine whether there is a slippage between gender and 
women in the plans. This would also include a look at linkages between 
women and girls. Although NAPs on UNSCR 1325 are deemed gender-
responsive documents, these texts often operate with a specific gender 
logic, which can be – broadly speaking – treating gender either as an 
empirical identity category (variable or descriptor of sex) or as an analyti-
cal category that reflects relations of power (Scott 1986). Laura Shepherd 
(2017: 102) concludes that UN Peacebuilding Commission texts articu-
late a logic of gender that is treated as “loosely synonymous” with sex 
and women. This has negative implications. First, when gender acts as a 
proxy for women, the real needs of actual women are negated. The fore-
grounding of gender in policymaking institutions may appear progressive 
but could also be a way to shift attention away from women and the 
radical interventions needed to overcome their position of disadvantage. 
It means that the policy focus has shifted from “women, to women and 
men and, finally, back to men” (Shepherd 2017: 102). This leads to the 
second implication – namely, that the discursive association of gender 
with women effectively confirms women’s lack of agency and subservi-
ent position in relation to men. Shepherd (2017) warns that such discur-
sive constructions may impact the amount of resources allocated to 
women’s programmes. 
The plans frequently employ gender-equality language in tandem with 
pro-women/pro-girls references. All the plans resemble the international 
(UN) liberal-feminist gender mainstreaming approach achieved through 
equal opportunities and strategies of inclusion, as in UNSCR 1325. For 
example, even though the term “gender equality” is used only four times in 
the LNAP, references to gender-aware policies (18), gender-blind codes of 
conduct (22), and gender sensitivity (35, 37) make up for it. Gender-
equality language (e.g. the integration of gender perspectives in all secur-
ity and peace activities) appears to be entangled with references to in-
creasing women’s participation and representation in peace and security. 
The UNAP argues that gender-related training tools must be reviewed 
against the extent to which “UN guidelines and materials on the protec-
tion, rights and the particular needs of women [... are] incorporated in 
the training of armed personnel” (35). The KNAP also links gender 
equality with women’s empowerment (8), their participation (14), and 
their human rights (15). 
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Evidence of the conflation of gender and women is extended 
through the lumping together of “women and girls.” This phrase is re-
peated 73 times in the LNAP, 60 times in the UNAP, and 47 times each 
in the NNAP and the KNAP. It is only in the LNAP that girls are men-
tioned “independently” – for instance, in terms of promoting their par-
ticipation in conflict prevention, early warning, and post-conflict recov-
ery (24); related to the reform of the juvenile justice system (23); in terms 
of abuse (27); regarding education and scholarships to study agriculture 
(36); and related to leadership preparation through camps, youth parlia-
ment, and peace clubs (40). In the UNAP, girls’ increased care workload 
during conflict is singled out (17), but the KNAP and NNAP do not 
refer to girls on their own. Similar to the problems associated with a 
gender–women slippage, the association of women with girls not only 
discursively reinforces the vulnerability of both women and children, but 
also infantilises women (Shepherd 2017: 113), casting them as being in 
need of care, like children. This construction is what Cynthia Enloe calls 
“womenandchildren.”5 This preoccupation with women and girls as a 
homogeneous identity category also “crowds out” the role of men or 
boys. The UNAP mentions boys 18 times, whereas both the LNAP and 
KNAP refer to boys only once. Although the NNAP refers to men a 
couple of times, it is silent on boys. 
The second aim in teasing out how gender is constructed in the 
plans is to determine whether gender is treated as a complex and mobile 
concept emphasising the multiplicity of women’s experiences as these 
relate to men’s multiple identities. My contention is that an unintended 
consequence of this tendency to conflate gender and women is the neg-
ation of multiple overlapping identities, which manifest when women 
and men experience security at the intersections of gender, race/ 
ethnicity, age, class, sexuality, and disability, to name a few. Here I seek 
to determine whether attention is paid to subtle inter- and intra-group 
differences, and, if applicable, to what extent the plans sanitise the 
complexity of identity construction when different identity groups are 
lumped together.  
In this respect, another reading of the plans reveals a much more 
ambiguous interpretation – one that is perhaps more reflective of the 
reality on the ground and that does not foreclose the possibility of the 
construction of transformative representations in the plans. Such a read-
ing reveals piecemeal evidence that identity categories are not always treat-
5  Coined by Cynthia Enloe in Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
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ed as homogeneous. In the NNAP, the definition of gender-responsive 
budgeting not only recognises that “biases […] can arise because a per-
son is male or female” but also takes into account “the disadvantages 
suffered as a result of ethnicity, caste, class or poverty status and loca-
tion” (35). The KNAP, too, refers to tolerance of ethnic, gender, and 
other diversities in security sector institutions (SSIs) (40). The LNAP 
specifically mentions “justice for juveniles – especially for girls” (23); the 
special needs of women and girls living with or caring for those living 
with HIV/AIDS, including women associated with the fighting forces 
(26); and the special needs of the disabled and widows (27). The UNAP 
singles out child perpetrators (29); minors – very young girl and boy vic-
tims of sexual violence (31); and women with disabilities who have to 
deal with SGBV issues (69). 
However, the gains made through attention to special needs are at 
times diluted by essentialist representations, such as in the LNAP where 
women are represented as “good female role models” (20) in a documen-
tary film on the security sector. The aim with the airing of this documen-
tary was to convey the message that increased female enrolment in the 
security sector is necessary “for their [women’s] enhanced protection and 
security” (20) and because more women in the security sector will help to 
shift negative public perceptions of SSIs (20). “Good female role models” 
thus become shorthand for the problematic assumption that the inclusion 
of women will make the armed forces more peaceful and law-abiding. 
There is, however, also evidence of some plans displaying a more nuanced 
perspective regarding women’s multiple roles. The UNAP states that  
rather than simply regarding women as helpless victims of war and 
violence, it is crucial to take into account their active roles as com-
batants, peacebuilders, politicians and activists. (14)  
Sanitised gender roles are somewhat avoided when the UNAP highlights 
masculinity and femininity/gender stereotypes (16); gender division of 
labour, women’s roles in the everyday (17); the assumption that only men 
can be combatants (18); and gender barriers and power imbalances in the 
household and public arena (22). The NNAP in a similar vein calls for 
advocacy against traditional practices that “perpetuate gender role stereo-
types” (27). The KNAP also acknowledges that women’s gender and 
peacemaking roles are not natural but contextual (10). The KNAP further 
recognises the structural roots of gender-based discrimination embedded 
in Kenya’s pre-2010 constitution, laws, policies, and practices (10).  
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Constructions of Security: Women Civilising War
The plans acknowledge the human-security approach, with an implicit 
holistic understanding of security that goes beyond the protection of 
physical (military and state) security to include socio-economic and envir-
onmental (everyday) security. The KNAP “recognizes that security threats 
include social, economic, and environmental factors” (12) and therefore 
supports dealing with “root causes of conflict” (14) through making a “crit-
ical link among gender equality, security, development, and human rights” 
(15). The foreword of the NNAP recognises the multidimensional nature 
of women’s insecurity, ranging from women-headed households to 
displacements, food insecurity, legal prohibition on owning land, bodily 
threats, and flooding (5). Broader people-centred notions of security in the 
LNAP are inferred through references to women’s increased access to 
housing, natural resources, and health education on reproductive health 
and HIV/AIDS (24). It can also be gleaned from the specification that 
women’s human rights extend beyond political rights to include their 
socio-economic right to equal access to resources in relation to property, 
land, and inheritance (34). A normative acknowledgement of security as 
affecting the lives of civilians in their local surroundings is therefore im-
plied in these constructions.  
But in order to come to some conclusion as to whether these are 
symbolic discourses, I focus in this section on who participated in the 
development of the plans and on how the participation of women in 
SSIs is represented and what this means for the realisation of more in-
clusive security.  
It is ironic that while UNSCR 1325 was drafted and vetted by women 
from civil society organisations across the globe, and therefore grounded 
to some extent in local needs and values (Weiss 2011), it was found that 
“only about a third of NAPs specify civil society involvement in their 
planning and drafting, while about 45 per cent mention some form of 
non-specific civil society involvement” (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b: 384). 
This suggests that the NAP development process may not be as partici-
patory as assumed and therefore much more reminiscent of the head-
quarters-driven process followed by subsequent WPS resolutions (Weiss 
2011). A brief examination of background information paints the devel-
opment process of the four African NAPs as a collaborative effort be-
tween the funders (national governments and UN bodies) and local part-
ners (activists/experts from local non-governmental organisations [NGOs] 
such as women’s associations, local staff working for missions of inter-
national organisations, and governmental actors). For instance, the UN 
Fund for Population Activities funded the development of the UNAP. 
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Individuals participated in different consultations (Miller, Pournik, and 
Swaine 2014). The LNAP includes a list of participating NGOs and refer-
ences community-based organisations (CBOs). Their partners (and fun-
ders) included UN Women, Action Aid, the Danish Refugee Council, 
International Alert, Oxfam GB, and governments (2). The development of 
the NNAP is described as a “very inclusive and participatory” process (10). 
UN Women provided technical and financial support; the ECOWAS 
Gender Development Centre and DFID’s Nigeria Stability Reconciliation 
Programme also provided financial assistance. The development of the 
KNAP was spearheaded by the National Steering Committee consisting of 
government, civil society organisations, and individuals, with financial and 
technical support from UN Women and the government of Finland.  
However, local participation does not guarantee local ownership. In 
this regard, Helen Basini and Caitlin Ryan’s (2016) study on Liberia and 
Sierra Leone reveals how the top-down state-centric character of the NAP 
development process harmed the WPS agenda. The LNAP paradoxically 
not only devotes attention to the role of women’s groups as implementers 
and watchdogs of the process, but also stresses women’s roles as facilita-
tors of funding from donors (39). The suitability of women’s organisations 
in drafting the plan is assumed without considering the possible negative 
implications of their role as multipliers of international discourse. The plan 
thus superficially acknowledges the importance of local partnerships but 
neglects a deeper feminist exploration of power asymmetry between the 
local and the international. In this regard, Emma Wamai (2011) observes 
that women’s networks played an important role in designing and imple-
menting the LNAP, but informal and rural women’s networks remain 
largely underrepresented in such technical meetings. Similarly, Ugandan 
measures to combat SGBV are devolved to “provide support to local 
leaders” and “mobilise and empower traditional health practitioners to 
handle SGBV cases” (32), but the UNAP is silent on the transformational 
role of local women’s organisations. In Nigeria, the absence of a UN mis-
sion means that there is little external pressure for NAP implementation, 
and this may open a space for local conceptions of security and gender 
inequalities to come to the fore (Ikpe 2011). However, the plan itself does 
not reflect this latent potential and very much resembles the cookie-cutter 
format of most plans. Although UN Women Kenya organised five Kenya 
Open Days on Partnership for Peace, as well as a High-Level Conference 
on WPS in 2012 to bring government, the international community, and 
local civil society together around WPS issues, the plan itself is silent on 
how the “local” is conceptualised (21–22).  
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Thus, evidence points to a contradictory mix of collaborative work 
and the exclusion of some groups, both in the language/framing and in 
the execution. It therefore necessitates more nuanced analysis of civil soci-
ety participation in security practices. Theoretically the input of civil soci-
ety is considered useful in countering statist tendencies by introducing 
human-security concerns through a bottom-up approach. At the same 
time we need to recognise that civil society is heterogeneous and does not 
automatically advocate non-statist notions of security. Equally, the fact that 
NAPs are tools of states at the national level should not presuppose their 
inevitable framing in elitist, Weberian, monopoly-of-violence language. 
The emphasis on the inclusion of women in the armed forces is 
framed liberally in the context of their “full/equal or active participation,” 
which is seldom explained or questioned. As Nigeria is not technically a 
country at war, more emphasis is placed on the outward-looking dimen-
sions of WPS in the NNAP (7), and by implication an emphasis on 
women’s participation in the military. The NNAP affirms Nigeria’s role as 
a significant troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping missions (9) 
and as “the fourth-largest contributor to peacekeeping operations” globally 
(12). Eka Ikpe also states that “as of December 2009, Nigeria was deploy-
ing the highest number of women globally” (Ikpe 2011: 94). This numeri-
cal “achievement” is an important measure of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
status. The UNAP – under one of its strategic objectives on women in 
leadership and decision-making – similarly devotes four out of seven stra-
tegic actions to women’s participation in armed forces and peacekeep-
ing/peacebuilding (34–36). The title of the KNAP – Kuhusisha Wanawake ni 
Kudumisha Amani (“to involve women is to sustain peace”) – appears be-
nign, even positive, but at the same time conjures up stereotypical as-
sumptions about the simplistic link between women and peace. By high-
lighting the importance of traditional knowledge and women’s involve-
ment in alternative forms of dispute resolution (38, 44, 45), there is also a 
risk of relegating women’s peacebuilding role to the “local” and thereby 
informal/private sphere. The LNAP makes a link between women’s par-
ticipation in the security sector and “their enhanced protection and secur-
ity” (20), rather than affirming their agency. Furthermore, the creation of 
peace clubs for girls (40) is juxtaposed with attempts by parent–teacher 
associations and the community to encourage girls to enrol in SSIs (41). 
The militarisation of women’s and girls’ participation makes “war safe for 
women” (Weiss 2011).6 The net effect of such contradictory messages is 
6  “Women civilising war,” the subtitle of this section, is a play on Cora Weiss’ 
warning that we should not make war safe for women. Also see Shepherd (2016). 
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that participation becomes elevated to an end in itself – opening the door 
for turning the tools of peace education on themselves and securitising the 
anti-militarist objectives of the WPS agenda. 
Constructions of Violence: Making Women Responsible 
for Preventing SGBV 
In the last theme I consider how violence has been framed in the four 
plans and draw on the relationship between the various WPS discourses 
(of prevention, participation, and protection) to reconstruct a picture of 
their transformative potential.  
A detailed reading of the four plans shows that they all include pre-
vention as a pillar. The conceptualisation of prevention cannot be separ-
ated from how peace is framed in the plans – as either the absence of 
armed conflict with a preference for managing conflicts or a long-term 
engagement with underlying structural causes (Basu and Confortini 
2017). In gender terms, prevention means assessing whether the role of 
gendered structures is considered in the entrenchment of institutions 
that perpetuate war, militarism, violence, and women’s insecurity (Basu 
and Confortini 2017). In relation to SGBV, it means that SGBV must be 
understood as both a trigger for and an outcome of violent conflict. 
Prevention efforts should then challenge harmful social norms and pro-
mote understandings of non-violent masculinities (Saferworld 2014). 
The plans reflect two types of discourses on prevention. The first 
discourse concerns the association of prevention with participation, 
frequently calling for women’s participation in conflict prevention, con-
flict resolution, and peacebuilding processes, although conflict preven-
tion is never clearly defined. Only the LNAP differentiates substantively 
between the types of participation that would contribute to prevention, 
when it highlights, for example, girls’ participation in peace clubs (13). 
Measures such as the mobilisation of resources for women’s active in-
volvement in conflict prevention, as mentioned in the KNAP (29) and 
NNAP (18), facilitate participation but do not speak directly to preven-
tion. The KNAP links indigenous and traditional knowledge-based sys-
tems with women’s roles in early warning (44–45), whereas the NNAP 
explains “preventive performance” as a strengthening of women’s roles 
in conflict resolution (18). The implication is therefore that women be-
come responsible for the prevention of violence. This comes with the 
assumption that “their agency will necessarily be exercised in productive 
and socially transformative ways” (Shepherd 2017: 117).  
 20 Heidi Hudson 
The second discourse links prevention and protection. All the plans 
make a strong connection between the prevention of SGBV and protec-
tion against SGBV. The goal of the LNAP is to prevent all types of vio-
lence against women and girls, including rape, systematic rape, traffick-
ing, and other human rights abuses (12, 13). The KNAP draws on the 
National Policy for the Prevention of and Response to Gender-Based Violence 
(2014) as well as the Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Vio-
lence against Women and Children (2006) of the ICGLR (15–16). The UNAP’s 
focus on SGBV prevention is also framed in the context of the latter 
protocol (20), the Goma Declaration (2008), and UNSCR 1820 (2008), 
with their strong protectionist slants. The UNAP states that apart from 
increasing women’s representation in decision-making, ensuring the 
protection of women and girls from gender-based violence is the other 
overall goal (10). There are encouraging initiatives to challenge gendered 
social norms related to SGBV, such as awareness raising and proactive 
institutional and community-based advocacy initiatives in the KNAP 
(49); the prevention of harmful traditional practices around reproductive 
health, girl-child education, and child marriage (NNAP 27); and the 
strengthening of institutions working on GBV (UNAP 42, 48). However, 
in some cases, such as in the LNAP framework, three strategic issues are 
devoted to protection, four to promotion, and only one to prevention 
(13). At times it thus appears as if prevention is framed as a means to the 
real end – protection.  
Similar to UNSCR 1325, the gender–prevention nexus in the plans 
is underdeveloped, and stands in service of the gender–participation and 
gender–protection connections. Feminist scholars criticise such “blind-
ness” for crafting a hierarchy of priorities that favour protection from 
the exceptional nature of SGBV during war at the expense of prevention 
of structural violence during peacetime. This has two implications: First, 
while a targeted campaign against SGBV is necessary, it risks treating 
SGBV as an issue separate from others, and further marginalises survivors 
of SGBV (Saferworld 2014). Jacqui True (2011) also warns that these 
discourses and practices become separated from the socio-political and 
economic root causes of gender inequality that fuel women’s vulnerabil-
ity to violence.  
In this regard, I find that the plans do go beyond wartime sexual vio-
lence (in the form of rape as a tool of war) to reflect a more holistic 
understanding of gender-based violence, both in terms of cause and 
consequence. In the NNAP, gender violence is framed in the broader 
context of both conflict and post-conflict situations (13) as a complex 
phenomenon that “can prevent women from accessing education, be-
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coming financially independent and […] participating in governance and 
peacebuilding” (7). Sexual violence is seen as debilitating development. 
But even in Liberia, where one would expect a narrow focus on SGBV 
“committed against [women] during the war years” (15), the scope is 
widened to focus on 
prevention of all types of violence against women (VAW) and 
particularly rape, domestic violence, sexual offences including sex-
ual harassment and abuse of young girls, harmful traditional prac-
tices, and human trafficking. (27)  
Although the UNAP is largely dominated by commitments to address 
sexual violence against women in armed conflict, it defines gender-based 
violence broadly to include “physical, sexual, psychological violence oc-
curring in the family, community, or perpetrated or condoned by the 
State” (13).  
A second consequence of the exceptionalisation of SGBV is that in 
the process of conflating broader SGBV discourses with rape discourses 
(or equating SGBV with violence against women and girls), it establishes 
an understanding of women as victims of male (sexual) violence. My 
findings here are less positive. Protection trumps prevention. The plans 
represent women’s and girls’ agency/victimhood in somewhat ambigu-
ous and circumscribed terms – they are in need of protection and need 
to be assisted in becoming agents. For instance, traumatised women and 
girls are seen in the LNAP as victims who deserve care, but also need to 
acquire “strengthened coping strategies” (16). Such language recognises 
the need for material intervention, as exemplified by the statement that 
the “war-widowed are empowered through skills training, micro-credit 
and loan facilities and are provided plots of land to produce environ-
mentally friendly bio-fuels” (16). However, these interventions take place 
on their behalf – hence the emphasis on “provision.” Similarly, civic 
education programmes to change attitudes and behaviour (27), such as 
peace education initiatives (32, 35, 39) reflect an understanding of struc-
tural violence but the good intentions come unstuck when essentialist 
ideas of women’s roles “in socializing the community to peace” (28) are 
raised. And although the UNAP links war-making and “norms of mas-
culinity” (16) and its impact on perceptions about women’s passivity and 
victimhood, and calls for debunking myths that fuel sexual violence (37), 
commitments to women’s agency remain superficial and tenuous.  
One of the main reasons for this ambivalent treatment of women’s 
and girls’ agency is because (despite rhetoric about adopting a gender 
perspective in conflict prevention) gender is loosely used as a synonym 
for women (Basu and Confortini 2017). The four plans use terms such as 
 22 Heidi Hudson 
violence against women and girls (VAWG) and (S)GBV interchangeably, 
seemingly unaware of the political implications of language choice. For 
example, the relation and/or distinction between the 17 references to 
VAWG and 21 references to (S)GBV in the LNAP is not clear and 
therefore tends to obscure the gendered power relations that underlie the 
violence. A Saferworld briefing clarifies the implications as follows:  
While violence against women and girls is a form of gender-based 
violence, by conflating the two (and in doing so, their causes) it is 
possible that any preventative activities may not address their spe-
cific underlying causes. Greater attention and resources are needed 
to document SGBV against men and boys. (Saferworld 2014: 3) 
If conflict prevention is seen to happen through increased women’s 
participation – thus making women responsible for conflict prevention – 
and if prevention is all about rape and/or SGBV, it follows that women 
become responsible for addressing SGBV. Instead of paying attention to 
complex normative gender practices of both men and women, increasing 
women’s representation at the peace table and in government becomes 
the main remedy.  
Conclusion  
NAPs are regarded as one of the ways to domesticate international in-
struments such as UNSCR 1325. The first part of the article considered 
the role and context of NAPs and motivated the choice of the four plans 
from Africa. In the review of WPS literature I emphasised the divergent 
views on the role of language in transforming security discourse and 
practice. The first school of thought argues that we are witnessing slow 
but tangible norm diffusion and institutionalisation of WPS architecture 
through the use of gender-specific language. The second school is hesi-
tant to celebrate such developments, and cautions that gender-sensitive 
language could mask lingering structural inequalities. In the final section 
I analysed the discourses in the four African plans through the lens of 
three sets of representations: women and gender, security, and violence. 
I read the plans for what they said or did not say, inferring the extent to 
which the language communicated the normative stance of the plan re-
garding WPS issues. 
To varying degrees, the plans reflect a combination of predomin-
antly liberal-feminist gender-equality language interspersed with some 
hints of critical-normative insight. And herein lie their defining features – 
ambivalence and paradox. First, in terms of representations of gen-
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der(ed) identities, it is not all doom and gloom. Although the language 
effectively equates women with gender, and women with girls (children), 
there is evidence across all four plans that rudimentary attention was 
paid to the intersecting needs of particular groups. Second, conceptual-
isations of security are hard to pin down. The majority of the plans 
acknowledge feminist interpretations of human security (mostly implicit-
ly) and the multidimensional nature of women’s insecurity (explicitly), 
only to privilege women’s participation in the security sector over genu-
ine local ownership – in the name of “their protection” and for the 
“greater good.” This militarisation of the WPS agenda is therefore 
founded on instrumentalist assumptions about women’s roles in trans-
forming security institutions. That said, except maybe for Nigeria, there 
is a sense that given the more inward-looking focus, plans from African 
countries recovering from war may appear to be less militaristic. But that 
can be confirmed only through a comprehensive survey of all African 
plans. Third, constructions of violence do not entirely follow the expected 
exceptionalising trend that one sees in international discourse, such as 
when “outward-looking” Northern plans forget about the violence of 
submerged gender discrimination in their own societies, and focus more 
on their outward reach to help others deal with their war-related SGBV. 
The plans generally display, at least in theory, a holistic understanding of 
violence beyond war. However, this positive trend is not sustained. The 
structural (gender) dimensions of prevention take a backseat to represen-
tations of gender–protection–participation connections. VAW and SGBV 
are conflated, which reinforces women’s victimhood. This, coupled with 
the imperative to increase women’s participation in the armed forces, 
creates an uncomfortable narrative of militarisation for the sake of both 
women’s protection and women becoming change agents in the “battle” 
against SGBV. 
Reflecting on the transformational potential of language, I contend 
that we cannot make a blanket claim that NAPs leave many of the im-
portant rules and discursive practices of the international peace and se-
curity institutions in place. On the one hand, the subtle production and 
reproduction of male power through the use of diplomatic-compromise 
language does pose a risk of relegating the gender question to the mar-
gins – despite or rather because of the women-focused language. This 
reading also confirms the conundrum that while it is a positive develop-
ment when security institutions recognise WPS issues, militarised lan-
guage confines the integration of WPS issues to a narrow understanding 
of peace and security. On the other hand, these “traps” can be mediated 
by following a reading that works with ambivalence rather than against it. 
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The mixed messages suggest that these plans have some capacity to chal-
lenge gendered power – there are glimpses of critical thinking that should 
be harnessed. Combined, the various degrees of gender-sensitive language 
– some intentional and the rest inadvertent – should be regarded as a con-
ceptual opening. Since NAPs are intended to holistically reflect the inten-
tion of UNSCR 1325, there should be room for creative engagement and 
for the opportunity to address some of the limitations of UNSCR 1325 
within the NAPs. A combination of radical-feminist intent, gender-friendly 
language, pragmatic execution, and context-sensitive indicators may stand 
a better chance of bringing about more inclusive security practices (Peace-
Women 2013). These NAPs, I submit, create dialogical spaces that do not 
necessarily produce emancipatory outcomes, but at least in a small way 
facilitate a conducive environment for the change to happen.  
Reading these discourses in the plans as if they were fixed, separate, 
and whole narratives is counterproductive. Language matters exactly be-
cause it cannot be pinned down. It is open-ended and fluid, and the dis-
courses that it helps to sustain are equally fragmented. The transform-
ative potential of language rests in this fragmented and ambiguous na-
ture, as it mitigates binary analyses, and instead produces nuance. In the 
same way that UN resolutions can send out mixed messages about 
women’s agency and victimhood, NAPs can also be read in ways that 
blur the lines of discursive fields (Shepherd 2011). I concur with Laura 
Shepherd, who argues that, in practice, “women” is used as an umbrella 
term representing “both the diversity of actual women seeking greater 
voice at multiple sites of political struggle, and also a whole array of 
gender arrangements which implicate men and women” (Kirby and 
Shepherd 2016a: 252; emphasis in original). I therefore conclude that 
these fragmented and fluid representations of women/gender, security, 
and (sexual) violence offer us an opening to figure out what gendered 
security means in Africa. The discursive content of the NAP is an im-
portant facilitator and co-producer of the material conditions in the 
spaces where policy is implemented. Language as the conveyer of mul-
tiple and entangled gendered meanings (some more radical than others) 
thus plays an important part in the production of gendered practices, 
with enormous power to change material futures for better or worse.  
The broad patterns of fragmentation reflected in the four plans 
could be useful in the analysis of other plans from Africa/the global 
South as these relate to and contrast with Northern plans. What we learn 
is that meaningful implementation in diverse and hostile contexts is de-
pendent on understanding that the language of the plans is more than 
just facilitator or impediment. The “messiness” of the discourses in the 
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four plans underscores their entanglement with the values of the devel-
opers and their discursive context. Reading NAPs productively as or-
ganic texts therefore makes them useful tools for UN gender officials 
and women’s organisations in Africa to reflexively and strategically use 
the WPS security architecture in innovative ways in pursuit of agency. 
Ultimately, language lies at “the heart of what the WPS agenda is, and 
what it might become” (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b: 374).  
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Die Macht widersprüchlicher Botschaften: Frauen, Frieden und 
der Sicherheitsjargon in afrikanischen National Action Plans 
Zusammenfassung: Vor dem Hintergrund globaler Diskurse zu „Frauen, 
Frieden und Sicherheit“ analysiert die Autorin die gender- und frauenbe-
zogene Sprache in vier Nationalen Aktionsplänen afrikanischer Staaten 
(Kenia, Liberia, Nigeria und Uganda), die mit Blick auf die Resolution 
1325 des UN-Sicherheitsrats entworfen wurden. Aus Sicht der Autorin 
besitzen Nationale Aktionspläne das Potenzial, die konsensorientierte 
Sprache der Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrats zu überwinden, und eröffnen 
daher neue Räume für politisches und praktisches feministisches Enga-
gement. Ihre Analyse deckt drei diskursive Themenbereiche auf: die Kon-
struktion von “Womenandchildren”, die Zivilisierung des Krieges durch 
Frauen und die Zuweisung von Verantwortung für die Verhütung ge-
schlechtsspezifischer Gewalt an die Frauen selbst. Alle drei Themenberei-
che haben einen Bezug zur Bildung geschlechtsspezifischer Identitäten 
sowie zu geschlechtsspezifischen Formen von Sicherheit und Gewalt. Auf 
unterschiedliche Weise kombinieren die Aktionspläne eine überwiegend 
liberal-feministisch geprägte Sprache mit kritischen Einsichten. Die Ambi-
valenz der Botschaften, die von diesen Plänen ausgehen, zeigt nach An-
sicht der Autorin, dass Diskurse Brüche aufweisen und damit die Möglich-
keit zur differenzierten Kontextanalyse und Umsetzung eröffnen. 
Schlagwörter: Afrika, Kenia, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung, Frauen, Frauenpolitik, Aktionsprogramm/Aktions-
plan, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000-10-31) 
